The A's Stadium Political Machine: 11 Lobbyists, Dual-Role Consultants, and a 9-Day Special Session
When the A's stadium bill died in regular session, Governor Lombardo called two special sessions in two days. 11 lobbyists descended on Carson City. The $380 million deal passed in just 9 days. They pretend to have debate to steal from you better.
When the initial A's stadium bill died on June 5, 2023, Governor Lombardo immediately called a special session—the second in two days. 11 registered lobbyists descended on Carson City. Nine days later, Nevada had committed $380 million to a billionaire's stadium.
The Special Session Maneuver
The original bill (SB509) failed in the regular legislative session with only 11 days to debate a $380 million commitment. Instead of accepting defeat, Lombardo called the 35th Special Session—an extraordinary move that:
- Limited public input opportunities
- Forced rapid consideration of complex financing
- Prevented normal committee review processes
- Compressed debate into a fraction of normal time
The restructured bill (now SB1) was introduced on June 5 and passed on June 14—just nine days for a 66-page bill committing hundreds of millions in public funds.
The Lobbyist Army
The A's deployed 11 registered lobbyists including:
- Team president Dave Kaval
- Four attorneys from Kaempfer Crowell law firm
- Alexander Dean from Sansome Partners
- And five others working the halls of Carson City
For context: a typical bill might have one or two lobbyists. The A's brought eleven to ensure their $380 million passed.
The Dual-Role Consultants
The most controversial advocacy came from apparent conflicts of interest that exploited pandemic-era loopholes in Nevada lobbying law.
Jeremy Aguero of Applied Analysis served simultaneously as:
- The A's paid consultant, producing economic projections claiming $1.3 billion annual impact and 14,000 construction jobs
- Administrative consultant to the Las Vegas Stadium Authority—the public oversight body supposedly providing independent review
He was being paid by the A's while serving the public body meant to oversee the deal. He avoided formal lobbyist registration requirements, allowing him to advocate while maintaining an appearance of neutral expertise.
Steve Hill, CEO of the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority and Stadium Authority chairman, testified before the legislature supporting the deal—despite his agency's financial interest in increased tourism.
NSEA spokesperson Alexander Marks noted: "We do know that at least Jeremy Aguero was being paid by the A's" while also serving the Stadium Authority.
Buying Votes
The bill initially faced opposition from progressive Democrats who prioritized education funding. To secure passage, negotiators made a deal:
Two critical amendments bought crucial Democratic votes:
- Resurrection of SB429—previously vetoed legislation requiring companies receiving tax abatements to offer paid family and medical leave
- Prevailing wage requirements for monorail projects
State Senators Edgar Flores and Fabian Doñate, initially undecided, voted yes after these amendments addressed labor priorities. The unrelated policy concessions traded for stadium votes.
The Narrow Margins
Despite the lobbying blitz and vote-buying, the bill passed by razor-thin margins:
- Assembly: 25-15 (needed 22)
- Senate: 13-8
Opposition came from unlikely bipartisan sources:
Rural Republicans (Hansen, Goicoechea, Gustavson) voted no on free-market principles. As Ira Hansen argued: "It's not my money. We're using taxpayer dollars to subsidize a private business."
Progressive Democrats including Assemblywoman Selena La Rue Hatch opposed on principle: "No amount of amendments are going to change the fact we are giving millions of public dollars to a billionaire."
The Economic Projections
Jeremy Aguero's economic projections—produced while being paid by the A's—claimed:
- $1.3 billion annual economic impact
- 14,000 construction jobs
- 405,000 "incremental visitors" specifically for A's games
Sports economists called this "nonsense." Dr. Roger Noll of Stanford noted: "This notion that of those 162 baseball games, I've got to see those three that are between the A's and the Royals in Las Vegas—it's just nonsense, right? It's not true, it's not going to happen."
Dr. Victor Matheson calculated the real employment impact: stadium workers across 81 home games work the equivalent of 15% of a full-time job. The claimed 8,000 ongoing jobs equals less than 100 full-time-equivalent positions.
"$1.5 billion to create less than 100 jobs. Wow," Matheson observed.
83% of Economists Agree
A 2017 survey found 83% of economists agree: "Providing state and local subsidies to build stadiums for professional sports teams is likely to cost the relevant taxpayers more than any local economic benefits that are generated."
Every single stadium proponent claims "this one will be different." Dr. Matheson emphasized: "Every single stadium deal I've ever looked at, the people who are supporting this say, 'This one will be different.' And when we look at it 15 to 20 years later, it's exactly the same as they always are."
The Public Never Got to Decide
Public opinion was closely divided—a May 2023 poll showed 41% supporting public funding, 38% opposing, and 21% undecided. Neither overwhelming support nor opposition.
Yet the speed and structure of the special session prevented meaningful public debate. The ballot referendum was blocked by courts. Voters never got to decide whether a billionaire's stadium should take priority over education.
That's how the political machine works.